The New York Times has an interesting article on the origins of morality. It’s not earth-shatteringly novel but it’s an accomplished summary of the idea that emotion precedes morality and has an evolutionary grounding.
The NYT article majors heavily on Dr. de Waal at Emory University, who trots out his observations of primate behaviour and suggests that some patterns of reaction and response can be seen as analagous to behaviours we would deem as moral.
Although the article cites David Hume as a philosopher who believed that emotion preceeded moral judgement, it nevertheless puts up Kant - who, I suppose, trumps Hume, just about, in oppositon - and contemporary, less impressive representatives of the Philosophy of Academia who are clearly narked that a Biologist is trampling on their lawn. Is, they say, does not imply ought.
Well of course it doesn’t, and rationality must have its say. But moral predilictions are not particularly rational, demonstrably, and I’m not sure an out-and-out rationalisation of moral choices would meet with anything other than an awkward discomfort until we all carried on as we were beforehand.
So here’s one version of a common moral dilemma:
A car is speeding down the road. You see that it cannot stop in time to avoid hitting a group of five unaware people just up the road. You are unable to make them aware of the situation; they are effectively helpless.
However, there is a large man standing beside you. You know that, if you push him in front of the car, it will hit him and skid off of the road, and the five people will live
Not suprisingly, most people do not choose to push the large man in front of the speeding car. But perhaps, if moral choices were rational choices, we should.
It’s unsuprising that the NYT article mentions Peter Singer, the well-regarded philosopher who has tried to persuade the UN to award human rights to the great apes. Singer is a rationalist par excellence and I have a great deal of time for his arguments. Once you’ve stepped onto the escalator of rationality you can’t get off until you’ve reached the end.
So Singer justifies abortion, painless infanticide and euthanasia, says that bestiality may be morally acceptable, that intelligence or personhood is not the trumping fact of moral consideration. And he’s correct, from a rational point of view, isn’t he? And given his job - a very successful professional philosopher - cold-headed rationality is helpful.
I think, though, that Singer’s appeal to the facts of animal biology and consciousness and capacity of suffering sits ironically with his seeming willingness to set aside our biological endowments. I cannot conceive of myself enjoying munching on a witchetty grub, I have never been able to climb heights without a feeling of vertigo, I am physically attracted to some people and not others. And I have a basic, unreasonable, emotional kick-start to my ethical positions, too.
Is doesn’t imply ought. But is can’t be entirely ignored, or else we’d all push that large man in front of the car and none of us would feel uneasy about our action.
I’m tempted by the cold, unblinking logic of Singer. But I feel empthy with the messy, contradictory biology. I’m torn.
